Pages that link to "Item:Q816096"

The following pages link to Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? (Q816096):

Displaying 8 items.

• Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes (Q266525) (← links)
• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser (Q274071) (← links)
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
• Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules (Q656803) (← links)
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees (Q777455) (← links)
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (Q898672) (← links)
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740) (← links)