A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods

DOI10.2307/2296963MaRDI QIDQ3968708zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric Maskin

Publication date 1983

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2296963

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesscheatproofnessdominant strategyindividual rationalitylocal truthful revelation of preferencesMDP proceduresneutralityplanning procedurespublic goodsstrongly locally individually incentive compatible procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(4)

• Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Incentive compatibility without compensation
• Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: structural properties and the serial Vickrey mechanism

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