A Note on the Security Framework of Two-key DbHtS MACs
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A Note on the Security Framework of Two-key DbHtS MACs
Recommendations
Cites work
- 3kf9: enhancing 3GPP-MAC beyond the birthday bound
- A new variant of PMAC: beyond the birthday bound
- Blockcipher-based MACs: beyond the birthday bound without message length
- Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC
- Generic attacks against beyond-birthday-bound MACs
- GIFT: a small present. Towards reaching the limit of lightweight encryption
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759779 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2086719 (Why is no real title available?)
- Improved Security Analyses for CBC MACs
- New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security Without Collision-Resistance
- PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
- Revisiting the security of DbHtS MACs: beyond-birthday-bound in the multi-user setting
- The “Coefficients H” Technique
- The sum of CBC MACs is a secure PRF
- Tight security bounds for double-block hash-then-sum MACs
- Tight security bounds for key-alternating ciphers
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