A comparison of first price multi-object auctions

DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9189-6MaRDI QIDQ842809zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Katerina Sherstyuk

Publication date 25 September 2009

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9189-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966904
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
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• An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies
• On multi-object auctions and matching theory: algorithmic aspects

Cites work

• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(3)

• On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction
• Revenue equivalence revisited
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

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