A controller-stopper-game with hidden controller type
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Abstract: We consider a continuous time stochastic dynamic game between a stopper (Player , the extit{owner} of an asset yielding an income) and a controller (Player , the extit{manager} of the asset), where the manager is either effective or non-effective. An effective manager can choose to exert low or high effort which corresponds to a high or a low positive drift for the accumulated income of the owner with random noise in terms of Brownian motion; where high effort comes at a cost for the manager. The manager earns a salary until the game is stopped by the owner, after which also no income is earned. A non-effective manager cannot act but still receives a salary. For this game we study (Nash) equilibria using stochastic filtering methods; in particular, in equilibrium the manager controls the learning rate (regarding the manager type) of the owner. First, we consider a strong formulation of the game which requires restrictive assumptions for the admissible controls, and find an equilibrium of (double) threshold type. Second, we consider a weak formulation, where a general set of admissible controls is considered. We show that the threshold equilibrium of the strong formulation is also an equilibrium in the weak formulation.
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