A fault attack on the Niederreiter cryptosystem using binary irreducible Goppa codes

DOI10.46298/JGCC.2020.12.1.6074MaRDI QIDQ6334138zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Julian Danner, Martin Kreuzer

Publication date 4 February 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.46298/JGCC.2020.12.1.6074

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications to coding theory and cryptography of arithmetic geometry (14G50) Cryptography (94A60)

Abstract: A fault injection framework for the decryption algorithm of the Niederreiter public-key cryptosystem using binary irreducible Goppa codes and classical decoding techniques is described. In particular, we obtain low-degree polynomial equations in parts of the secret key. For the resulting system of polynomial equations, we present an efficient solving strategy and show how to extend certain solutions to alternative secret keys. We also provide estimates for the expected number of required fault injections, apply the framework to state-of-the-art security levels, and propose countermeasures against this type of fault attack.

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