A generalization of Nash's theorem with higher-order functionals
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Abstract: The recent theory of sequential games and selection functions by Mar- tin Escardo and Paulo Oliva is extended to games in which players move simultaneously. The Nash existence theorem for mixed-strategy equilibria of finite games is generalised to games defined by selection functions. A normal form construction is given which generalises the game-theoretic normal form, and its soundness is proven. Minimax strategies also gener- alise to the new class of games and are computed by the Berardi-Bezem- Coquand functional, studied in proof theory as an interpretation of the axiom of countable choice.
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Cites work
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces
- On the computational content of the axiom of choice
- Selection functions, bar recursion and backward induction
- Sequential games and optimal strategies
- Strongly majorizable functionals of finite type: A model for barrecursion containing discontinuous functionals
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