A generic framework for side-channel attacks against LWE-based cryptosystems

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-91101-9_1MaRDI QIDQ6891175zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Julius Hermelink, Silvan Streit, Erik Mårtensson, Richard Petri

Publication date 2 December 2025

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91101-9_1

zbMATH Keywords

belief propagationKyberlattice reductionlattice-based cryptographyML-KEMside-channel attacks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites work

• Decryption failure attacks on IND-CCA secure lattice-based schemes
• Fault-enabled chosen-ciphertext attacks on Kyber
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3174791 (Why is no real title available?)
• LWE with side information: attacks and concrete security estimation
• More practical single-trace attacks on the number theoretic transform
• On the concrete hardness of learning with errors
• Revisiting security estimation for LWE with hints from a geometric perspective
• Single-trace side-channel attacks on masked lattice-based encryption
• Soft analytical side-channel attacks
• Too many hints -- when LLL breaks LWE

Cited in

(2)

• Finding and protecting the weakest link. On side-channel attacks on \(\mathrm{y}\) in masked ML-DSA
• Single-trace key recovery attacks on HQC using valid and invalid ciphertexts

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