A geometric characterisation of the compromise value

DOI10.1007/S001860400407MaRDI QIDQ2573782zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julio González-Díaz, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx, Marieke Quant

Publication date 24 November 2005

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/47f24376-3c3c-4097-a54e-da4d22031865

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
• The average-of-awards rule for claims problems
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• The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility

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