A simple characterization of plurality rule
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(43)- Informational requirements of social choice rules
- Size approval voting
- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
- Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
- Group support and top-heavy rules
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
- A law of large numbers for weighted plurality
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election
- The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
- Unanimity and resource monotonicity
- Is majority consistency possible?
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Role of the plurality rule in multiple choices
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Variable-population voting rules
- Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
- On two choice rules similar to the plurality rule and Borda’s rule
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- Multi-winner rules analogous to the plurality rule
- An extension of May's theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
- Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
- Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
- Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
- A characterization of simple majority rule for restricted domains
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