A simple higher-order rational email-game bubble model

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2026.105284MaRDI QIDQ7240160zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Feng Liu

Publication date 11 May 2026

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JEDC.2026.105284

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationelectronic-mail gamegreater-fool bubbleshigher-order knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A finite model of riding bubbles
• A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles
• A robust model of bubbles with multidimensional uncertainty
• A THREE‐STATE RATIONAL GREATER‐FOOL BUBBLE MODEL WITH INTERTEMPORAL CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING
• Agreeing to disagree
• Bubbles and Crashes
• Finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information
• Game theory
• Rational bubbles and middlemen
• Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge
• The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
• The simplest rational greater-fool bubble model

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