A structural model of electoral accountability

DOI10.1111/IERE.12361MaRDI QIDQ5225170zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Borağan Aruoba, Allan Drazen, Razvan Vlaicu

Publication date 19 July 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12361

zbMATH Keywords

electoral accountabilitypolitical agency modelvoter welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Welfare economics (91B15) History, political science (91F10)

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• Estimating Incumbency Advantage and Its Variation, as an Example of a Before–After Study
• Structural analysis of Tullock contests with an application to U.S. House of Representatives elections

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