Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2023.1361MaRDI QIDQ6149399zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simina Brânzei, Fedor Sandomirskiy

Publication date 5 March 2024

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.01766

zbMATH Keywords

badschorescompetitive ruleconsumption graphfair divisionmarket equilibriumPareto frontierpolynomial algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities, when money transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known to be the best mechanism for goods with additive utilities and was recently extended to chores by Bogomolnaia et al (2017). For both goods and chores, the rule produces Pareto optimal and envy-free allocations. In the case of goods, the outcome of the competitive rule can be easily computed. Competitive allocations solve the Eisenberg-Gale convex program; hence the outcome is unique and can be approximately found by standard gradient methods. An exact algorithm that runs in polynomial time in the number of agents and goods was given by Orlin. In the case of chores, the competitive rule does not solve any convex optimization problem; instead, competitive allocations correspond to local minima, local maxima, and saddle points of the Nash Social Welfare on the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible utilities. The rule becomes multivalued and none of the standard methods can be applied to compute its outcome. In this paper, we show that all the outcomes of the competitive rule for chores can be computed in strongly polynomial time if either the number of agents or the number of chores is fixed. The approach is based on a combination of three ideas: all consumption graphs of Pareto optimal allocations can be listed in polynomial time; for a given consumption graph, a candidate for a competitive allocation can be constructed via explicit formula; and a given allocation can be checked for being competitive using a maximum flow computation as in Devanur et al (2002). Our algorithm immediately gives an approximately-fair allocation of indivisible chores by the rounding technique of Barman and Krishnamurthy (2018).

Recommendations

• When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores
• Approximately EFX allocations for indivisible chores
• A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna
• On Approximate Envy-Freeness for Indivisible Chores and Mixed Resources

Cited in

(5)

• On Approximate Envy-Freeness for Indivisible Chores and Mixed Resources
• A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna
• Fair profit division
• Weighted EF1 allocations for indivisible chores
• Tree splitting based rounding scheme for weighted proportional allocations with subsidy

This page was built for publication: Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6149399)