An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
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This papers establishes, for finite sets of alternatives and finite sets of decision makers with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, conditions on the set of utilities which are necessary and sufficient for the equivalence between a lottery being Pareto efficient for some utility function and the absence of other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate it. This result includes the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem as a special case.
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Cites work
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Constrained school choice
- Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
- Lectures on Polytopes
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
Cited in
(17)- An impossibility theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
- A strict expected multi-utility theorem
- Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known
- Multicriteria efficiency with arbitrary finite sets and cyclic preferences
- Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations
- An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
- Preferences and decisions under incomplete knowledge. Dedicated to Marc Roubens on the occasion of his 60th anniversary
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On rationalizability in games with private values
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- Empirical welfare economics
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
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