An evolutionary game analysis of a dynamically switching zero-determinant strategy

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2025.129862MaRDI QIDQ7249598zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Huaihe Huang, Ye Ye, Wei Bao, Neng-Gang Xie, Yue Zhang

Publication date 18 May 2026

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.AMC.2025.129862

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative behaviorpopulation evolutionary gamesynthetic networkszero-determinant strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX) Game theory (91Axx) Biology and other natural sciences (92-XX)

Cites work

• Evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
• From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent

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