Apportionment methods
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Abstract: Most democratic countries use election methods to transform election results into whole numbers which usually give the number of seats in a legislative body the parties obtained. Which election method does this best can be specified by measuring the error between the allocated result and the ideal proportion. We show how to find an election method which is best suited to a given error function. We also discuss several properties of election methods that have been labelled paradoxa. In particular we explain the highly publicised ``Alabama Paradox for the Hare/Hamilton method and show that other popular election methods come with their very own paradoxa.
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Cites work
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Cited in
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