Arrovian aggregation models
\textit{K. J. Arrow}'s [Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley (1951; Zbl 0984.91513)] half century old paradox roughly goes as follows. There are at least three candidates and at least two voters, each (linearly) rank-ordering the candidates. A symmetric function, increasing in each vote, is defined for all possible rankings by the voters, yielding aggregate rankings such that for any pair of candidates neither aggregate ranking order is excluded (``citizen's sovereignity) and the aggragate ranking of any two candidates is independent of the individual rankings of others (``independence of irrelevant alternatives). Surprisingly, these assumptions are satisfied only by ``dictatorial aggregation functions, which yield exactly the ordering of one of the voters. An immense literature followed, partly containing similar paradoxes and partly offering ways to avoiding the paradox. The present book summarizes some (but by far not all) these results and offers the author's own contributions. After the introductory Preface and Introduction (Chapter 1), further chapters deal with ``rationality (reasonableness; Chapter 2), social decision functions (Chapter 3), ``functional aggregation rules (which transform individual choice functions into a social choice function; Chapter 4) and ``social choice correspondences (which transform individual binary relations into social choice functions; Chapter 5).
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348
- Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments
- Functional local operators in voting theory. II
- Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
- Majority decisions when abstention is possible
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1071776
- Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem
- Strategic description of social choice
- `\(q\)-Pareto-scalar' two-stage extremization model and its reducibility to one-stage model
- Removal independent consensus methods for closed \(\beta \)-systems of sets
- A non-dictatorial compromise
- Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem
- Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
- Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
- Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
- Generalized Rawlsianism
- Ultraproducts and aggregation
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- Local voting models. A review of the axiomatic methods
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains
- On dynamic aggregation systems
- Simple collective identity functions
- Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology
- Implementation of voting operators
- The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
- A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Arrowian social equilibrium: indecisiveness, influence and rational social choices under majority rule
- Social choice and individual values
- Some axiomatic limitations for consensus and supertree functions on hierarchies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4149835 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1143643 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- A model of aggregation and dissociation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405564 (Why is no real title available?)
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Choice Functions on Tree Quasi-Orders
- Properties and complexity of some superposition choice procedures
- A model of noncompensatory aggregation with an arbitrary collection of grades
- A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains
- A non-utilitarian discrete choice model for preference aggregation
- Reduction theorems in the social choice theory
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- On one class of non-local aggregation rules
- Social threshold aggregations
- Joint desirability foundations of social choice and opinion pooling
- Judgment aggregators and Boolean algebra homomorphisms
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
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