Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
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Cites work
- A Bayesian approach to relevance in game playing
- Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
- Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
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- Deliberation scheduling for problem solving in time-constrained environments
- Efficient computation of behavior strategies
- Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Handbook of computational economics. Vol. 1
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- Microeconomic theory
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- Optimization by simulated annealing
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Cited in
(9)- Bargaining with many players: a limit result
- Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation
- Computer science and decision theory
- Human-computer negotiation in a three player market setting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966915 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
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