Bayesian Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent incomplete-information aggregative games

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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation function for distributed incomplete-information situations. Since the feasible strategies are infinite-dimensional functions and lie in a non-compact set, the continuity of types brings barriers to seeking equilibria. To this end, we discretize the continuous types and then prove that the equilibrium of the derived discretized model is an epsilon-BNE. On this basis, we propose a distributed algorithm for an epsilon-BNE and further prove its convergence.












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