Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
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Cites work
- A General Approach to Lower Semicontinuity and Lower Closure in Optimal Control Theory
- A generalization of a problem of Steinhaus
- A selection theorem for optimization problems
- A sufficient condition for continuity of optimal sets in mathematical programming
- Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Measurable relations
- Multifunctions with values in a space of probability measures
- New sequential compactness results for spaces of scalarly integrable functions
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
Cited in
(19)- Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
- A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Near-optimal and robust mechanism design for covering problems with correlated players
- A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Computing a mechanism for a Bayesian and partially observable Markov approach
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
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