CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN UTILIZING A COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.1998.TB00307.XMaRDI QIDQ5471239zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nir Becker

Publication date 6 June 2006

Published in Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.1998.tb00307.x

zbMATH Keywords

common property resourcesgame theorywater resources

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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(2)

• Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective
• A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation

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