CREDIBILITY AND INTERTEMPORAL CONSISTENCY

DOI10.1017/S1365100597004069MaRDI QIDQ4233485zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kiminori Matsuyama

Publication date 5 July 1999

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100597004069

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitymacroeconomic policy gamesrenegotiation-proofsymmetric punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economic growth models (91B62) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Time inconsistency and reputation in monetary policy: a strategic modelling in continuous time
• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
• Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
• The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility
• Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy.
• Caution in macroeconomic policy: Uncertainty and the relative intensity of policy
• The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies
• Bounded rationality, monetary policy, and macroeconomic stability
• A Macro Model of Conjectural Equilibrium

Cited in

(4)

• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
• Credible forward guidance

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