Characterization of strongly secure authenticated key exchanges without NAXOS technique
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Recommendations
- An eCK-secure authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles
- Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange
- Session-StateReveal is stronger than eCKs EphemeralKeyReveal: using automatic analysis to attack the NAXOS protocol
- Strongly secure one round authenticated key exchange protocol with perfect forward security
- Designing efficient authenticated key exchange resilient to leakage of ephemeral secret keys
Cites work
- A secure and efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol
- An eCK-secure authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles
- Authenticated Key Exchange and Key Encapsulation in the Standard Model
- Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman protocols
- Designing efficient authenticated key exchange resilient to leakage of ephemeral secret keys
- HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1618043 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1722690 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1024060 (Why is no real title available?)
- Key agreement protocols and their security analysis
- New directions in cryptography
- Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
- Security proofs for signature schemes
- Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange
- The Twin Diffie-Hellman Problem and Applications
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