Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
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Cites work
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- No-envy in queueing problems
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
Cited in
(8)- Fairness in group identification
- Reordering an existing queue
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
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