Chomskyan arguments against truth-conditional semantics based on variability and co-predication

DOI10.1007/S10670-019-00138-XMaRDI QIDQ6652875zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Agustín Vicente

Publication date 13 December 2024

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10670-019-00138-X

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Recommendations

• Semantic theories, linguistic essences, and knowledge of meaning
• Some limitations to the psychological orientation in semantic theory
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Cites work

• Truth-conditional pragmatics: an overview

Cited in

(2)

• Copredication, Davidson and logical form
• Truth-conditional cognitivism and the lexical problem

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