Closed-Loop Stackelberg Strategy for Linear-Quadratic Leader-Follower Game
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Abstract: This paper is concerned with the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy for linear-quadratic leader-follower game. Completely different from the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg strategy, the solvability of the closed-loop solution even the linear case remains challenging. The main contribution of the paper is to derive the explicitly linear closed-loop Stackelberg strategy with one-step memory in terms of Riccati equations. The key technique is to apply the constrained maximum principle to the leader-follower game and explicitly solve the corresponding forward and backward difference equations. Numerical examples verify the effectiveness of the results, which achieves better performance than feedback strategy.
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