Coded Merkle tree: solving data availability attacks in blockchains
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Abstract: In this paper, we propose coded Merkle tree (CMT), a novel hash accumulator that offers a constant-cost protection against data availability attacks in blockchains, even if the majority of the network nodes are malicious. A CMT is constructed using a family of sparse erasure codes on each layer, and is recovered by iteratively applying a peeling-decoding technique that enables a compact proof for data availability attack on any layer. Our algorithm enables any node to verify the full availability of any data block generated by the system by just downloading a byte block hash commitment and randomly sampling bytes, where is the size of the data block. With the help of only one connected honest node in the system, our method also allows any node to verify any tampering of the coded Merkle tree by just downloading bytes. We provide a modular library for CMT in Rust and Python and demonstrate its efficacy inside the Parity Bitcoin client.
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