Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability.

DOI10.1007/S001820050092MaRDI QIDQ1972597zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karl Wärneryd

Publication date 11 April 2000

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1145780/KW5621651.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcommon interest gamescomplexityevolutionary stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited in

(12)

• Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
• Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
• The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate
• On evolving social systems: Communication, speciation and symbiogenesis
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Classes of communication and the conditions for their evolution
• Classes of communication and the conditions for their evolution
• Guest editorial: Introduction

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