Community enforcement using modal actions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.104972MaRDI QIDQ2288532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sam Jindani

Publication date 20 January 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104972

zbMATH Keywords

community enforcementinformation transmissionmodal actionsrandom matchingrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Enforcing social norms: trust-building and community enforcement
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies

Cites work

• Bounded memory folk theorem
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Enforcing social norms: trust-building and community enforcement
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• HELPING BEHAVIOR IN LARGE SOCIETIES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• Observations on cooperation
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Repeated games with one-memory
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Social norms and random matching games
• The evolution of cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Sustaining cooperation through strategic self-interested actions
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Community enforcement with observation costs
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Rules with discretion and local information
• Enforcing social norms: trust-building and community enforcement
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play

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