Compatibility, network effects, and collusion
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(16)- Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
- Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
- Collusion between non-differentiated two-sided platforms
- Inter-group competition through joint marketing efforts and intra-group Cournot competition
- Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly
- Optimal compatibility in systems markets
- Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks
- Collusive Market Structure Under Learning-By-Doing and Increasing Returns
- Competition versus collusion: the impact of consumer inertia
- Competition and networks of collaboration
- Content provision and compatibility in a platform market
- Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition
- Strategic product compatibility in network industries
- Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility
- A dynamic analysis of collusive networks
- Oligopoly with network effects: firm-specific versus single network
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