Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract

DOI10.2307/2298035MaRDI QIDQ4860684zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Beaudry, Michel Poitevin

Publication date 16 January 1996

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2298035

zbMATH Keywords

recontracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cited in

(3)

• Screening and financial contracting in the face of outside competition
• Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness *
• SCREENING AS A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, RENEGOTIATION, AND BANKRUPTCY

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