Competitive envy-free division
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We are concerned with a fair division problem in which the indivisible ``goods to be distributed among a finite number of individuals have divisible ``bads associated with them. The problem is formulated and analyzed in terms of the housemates problem. We present an efficient procedure that decides whether an envy-free solution exists, and if so, finds one of them; otherwise finds a solution such that each envious housemate is assigned a room whose rent is zero.
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Cited in
(15)- A comparison of formulations and solution methods for the minimum-envy location problem
- On finding an envy-free Pareto-optimal division
- Fair division with subsidy
- Envy-freeness in house allocation problems
- The problem of fair division for a hybrid resource
- Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
- How to decrease the degree of envy in allocations of indivisible goods
- Envy-free divisions
- Envy-Free Division of Land
- Rental harmony with roommates
- Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2088164 (Why is no real title available?)
- Generalized rental harmony
- Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for fair rent division
- Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for fair rent division
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