Complexities of electing diverse committees
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Selecting diverse committees with candidates from multiple categories
- The hidden side of the ballot box. A mathematical look at electoral procedures
- How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
- Can the committee meet? A Markov chain analysis
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
Cites work
- A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule
- A comparison of Dodgson's method and the Borda count
- Basic Geometry of Voting
- Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
- Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis
- Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Voting by Committees
- Voting by committees under constraints
Cited in
(11)- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Selecting diverse committees with candidates from multiple categories
- Need for Diversity in Elected Decision-Making Bodies: Economics-Related Analysis
- Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice
- Approval elections with a variable number of winners
- Can the committee meet? A Markov chain analysis
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Specialization and partisanship in committee search
- Algebraic voting theory \& representations of \(S_m \wr S_n\)
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- Coincidence of Condorcet committees
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