Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(20)- Patrolling security games: definition and algorithms for solving large instances with single patroller and single intruder
- Catch games: the impact of modeling decisions
- Decoy allocation games on graphs with temporal logic objectives
- A game theoretic framework for software diversity for network security
- On the characterization of saddle point equilibrium for security games with additive utility
- Using one-sided partially observable stochastic games for solving zero-sum security games with sequential attacks
- Game theory on attack graph for cyber deception
- Modeling and mitigating link-flooding distributed denial-of-service attacks via learning in Stackelberg games
- Dynamic games in cyber-physical security: an overview
- Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games
- Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case
- Risk averse Stackelberg security games with quantal response
- Discussion of fairness and implementability in Stackelberg security games
- Tackling sequential attacks in security games
- A unified framework for multistage mixed integer linear optimization
- On Stackelberg mixed strategies
- A complete analysis on the risk of using quantal response: when attacker maliciously changes behavior under uncertainty
- The risk of attacker behavioral learning: can attacker fool defender under uncertainty?
- Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
- Interdependent defense games with applications to internet security at the level of autonomous systems
This page was built for publication: Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2894081)
