Conditional punishment

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.017MaRDI QIDQ485575zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kenju Kamei

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://dro.dur.ac.uk/19796/1/19796.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationexperimentspunishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

Cited in

(3)

• Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
• WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME
• Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game

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