Constitutional implementation.

DOI10.1007/S100580200074MaRDI QIDQ1811240zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg, Eyal Winter

Publication date 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200074

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumeffectivity functionconstitution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
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Cited in

(14)

• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• Implementation via rights structures
• A stability index for local effectivity functions
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
• CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER AMBIGUITY: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
• Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

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