Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9070-2MaRDI QIDQ1025630zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Lanzi, Jérôme Mathis

Publication date 19 June 2009

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2313/1/cepcp.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Recommendations

• Publication:4734607
• Handling uncertainty when getting contradictory advice from experts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079520
• Consulting collusive experts
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1029177
• Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability

Cites work

• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(7)

• Preselection and expert advice
• Consulting collusive experts
• Handling uncertainty when getting contradictory advice from experts
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Does consultation improve decision-making?
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

This page was built for publication: Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1025630)