Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
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Cites work
- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Barriers to manipulation in voting
- Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
- Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
- Clustering to minimize the maximum intercluster distance
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Control and bribery in voting
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Dichotomy for pure scoring rules under manipulative electoral actions
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Duplication monotonicity in the allocation of indivisible goods
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- Fair division of indivisible items
- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- False-name manipulation in weighted voting games is hard for probabilistic polynomial time
- False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
- Hedonic games
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5957305 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3888913 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction to the theory of voting
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mathematical Derivation of an Election System
- Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: why ``pack and crack does not work
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
- Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Swap bribery
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- Weighted electoral control
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
Cited in
(6)- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Online voter control in sequential elections
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
- A group decision-making and optimization method based on relative inverse number
- On the parameterized complexity of controlling amendment and successive winners
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