Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.01.003MaRDI QIDQ533916zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Serkan Kucuksenel

Publication date 10 May 2011

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoretwo-sided matchinglattice structureassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of functional analysis in optimization, convex analysis, mathematical programming, economics (46N10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Assignment games with stable core
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Characterization of cores of assignment games
• A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
• A short and constructive proof of Tarski's fixed-point theorem
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game

Cited in

(6)

• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
• Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
• Some fixed-point results for the dynamic assignment problem
• The assignment game: the \(\tau\)-value
• A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games

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