Cracking down on bribery

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0883-6MaRDI QIDQ892871zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sheheryar Banuri, Catherine Eckel

Publication date 12 November 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/55531/1/Banuri_Eckel_Cracking_Down_12_31_2014.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000791
• Manipulation through bribes
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• Interim bribery in auctions

Cites work

• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
• Cracking down on bribery
• On the cultural transmission of corruption
• Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments

Cited in

(8)

• Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
• The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
• The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence
• The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations
• Joint misrepresentation with bribes
• Cracking down on bribery
• A restriction on lobbyist donations
• Corrupt police

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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