Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis

DOI10.1145/167088.167260MaRDI QIDQ5248538zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Simon, Charles W. Rackoff

Publication date 7 May 2015

Published in Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '93 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/167088.167260

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(22)

• The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
• Buses for anonymous message delivery
• Shuffling large decks of cards and the Bernoulli-Laplace urn model
• New bounds for randomized busing
• An efficient protocol for anonymous multicast and reception.
• Private authentication
• Provable unlinkability against traffic analysis with low message overhead
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1690173 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Entropy Based Encrypted Traffic Classifier
• Cryptogenography
• Anonymous communication and anonymous cash
• Secure Multi-party Shuffling
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16478 (Why is no real title available?)
• Financial Cryptography
• Practical and provably secure onion routing
• Perfect anonymity
• Information Security
• Footprint scheduling for dining-cryptographer networks
• The effect of false positives: Why fuzzy message detection leads to fuzzy privacy guarantees?
• Poly onions: achieving anonymity in the presence of churn
• Instantiability of classical random-oracle-model encryption transforms
• Bruisable onions: anonymous communication in the asynchronous model

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