Cyber Physical Attacks with Control Objectives
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Abstract: This paper studies attackers with control objectives against cyber-physical systems (CPS). The system is equipped with its own controller and attack detector, and the goal of the attacker is to move the system to a target state while altering the system's actuator input and sensor output to avoid detection. We formulate a cost function that reflects the attacker's goals, and, using dynamic programming, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. By changing the parameters of the cost function, we show how an attacker can design optimal attacks to balance the control objective and the detection avoidance objective. Finally, we provide a numerical illustration based on a remotely-controlled helicopter under attack.
Cited in
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- Detection of stealthy false data injection attacks against cyber-physical systems: a stochastic coding scheme
- Optimal deception attacks against remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems
- Worst-case \(\varepsilon \)-stealthy false data injection attacks in cyber-physical systems
- Vulnerability analysis of distributed state estimation under joint deception attacks
- Optimal strictly stealthy attacks in cyber-physical systems with multiple channels under the energy constraint
- Security of networked control systems subject to deception attacks: a survey
- False data injection attacks on sensors against state estimation in cyber-physical systems
- Quickest physical watermarking-based detection of measurement replacement attacks in networked control systems
- Quickest detection of deception attacks on cyber-physical systems with a parsimonious watermarking policy
- Stealthy switching attacks on sensors against state estimation in cyber‐physical systems
- Vulnerability analysis for a class of nonlinear cyber-physical systems under stealthy attacks
- Analysis of stealthy false data injection attacks against networked control systems: three case studies
- Two-channel stealthy false data injection attacks design without estimator knowledge
- A novel cyber attack design scheme based on system subspace analysis
- Kullback-Leibler divergence-based filter design against bias injection attacks
- Optimal data injection attack design for spacecraft systems via a model free Q-learning approach
- Heuristic learning for co-design scheme of optimal sequential attack
- Reachability analysis of interconnected systems under stealthy attacks
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