DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY

DOI10.1017/S1365100597004033MaRDI QIDQ4233482zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Maurice Obstfeld

Publication date 16 March 1999

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100597004033

zbMATH Keywords

inflationMarkov perfect equilibriumpublic debtrational responses to government policiesseigniorage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(8)

• Seigniorage payments for use of the dollar: 1977--1995
• Credibility, smooth expectation and inflation persistence
• Central bank independence and public debt policy
• Seigniorage and conventional taxation with multiple exogenous shocks
• Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game
• Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game
• Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited
• Optimal monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are unavailable: A reconsideration of the outcomes under commitment and discretion

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