Delegating learning

DOI10.3982/TE4191MaRDI QIDQ5164467zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan F. Escobar, Qiaoxi Zhang

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4191

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcommitmentdeadlinesdelaysdelegationprivate learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(6)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithms for recursive delegation
• On the (non-) reliance on algorithms -- a decision-theoretic account
• Delegation to incentivize information production
• Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
• Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation

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