Deterrence in networks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.02.001MaRDI QIDQ7009267zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Leo Bao, Lata Gangadharan, C. Matthew Leister

Publication date 20 March 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

deterrenceexperimentlevel-knetwork

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites work

• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
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• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
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• Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
• Social networks and crime decisions: the role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behavior
• Social networks and interactions in cities
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

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