Does Secure Time-Stamping Imply Collision-Free Hash Functions?
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Recommendations
- Can We Construct Unbounded Time-Stamping Schemes from Collision-Free Hash Functions?
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1303133
- Long-term secure time-stamping using preimage-aware hash functions (short version)
- On Provably Secure Time-Stamping Schemes
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- Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2004
Cites work
- Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2004
- Applied Cryptography and Network Security
- Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD
- Efficient Collision Search Attacks on SHA-0
- Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1
- Herding Hash Functions and the Nostradamus Attack
- How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1303133 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 826064 (Why is no real title available?)
- On Provably Secure Time-Stamping Schemes
- Theory of Cryptography
- Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005
Cited in
(5)- Analysis of client-side security for long-term time-stamping services
- Security proofs for hash tree time-stamping using hash functions with small output size
- On Provably Secure Time-Stamping Schemes
- Can We Construct Unbounded Time-Stamping Schemes from Collision-Free Hash Functions?
- Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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