Dynamic Models of Appraisal Networks Explaining Collective Learning

DOI10.1109/TAC.2017.2775963MaRDI QIDQ4682349zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wenjun Mei, Noah E. Friedkin, Kyle M. Lewis, Francesco Bullo

Publication date 18 September 2018

Published in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.09546

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Abstract: This paper proposes models of learning process in teams of individuals who collectively execute a sequence of tasks and whose actions are determined by individual skill levels and networks of interpersonal appraisals and influence. The closely-related proposed models have increasing complexity, starting with a centralized manager-based assignment and learning model, and finishing with a social model of interpersonal appraisal, assignments, learning, and influences. We show how rational optimal behavior arises along the task sequence for each model, and discuss conditions of suboptimality. Our models are grounded in replicator dynamics from evolutionary games, influence networks from mathematical sociology, and transactive memory systems from organization science.

Cited in

(5)

• Criteria for asymptotic clustering of opinion dynamics towards bimodal consensus
• Passivity-based analysis and design for population dynamics with conformity biases
• On the herdability of linear time-invariant systems with special topological structures
• Coevolution of opinion dynamics on evolving signed appraisal networks
• Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence From Two Experiments

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