Dynamic analysis of evolutionary game considering individual influence

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2025.130696MaRDI QIDQ6915412zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Boyuan Xue, Yuhan Hu

Publication date 15 October 2025

Published in Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.PHYSA.2025.130696

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gameinfluential cooperationPrisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites work

• Ability-based asymmetrical fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
• Emergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma via a reward mechanism
• Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
• Reward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• The eco-evolutionary dynamics of two strategic species: from the predator-prey to the innocent-spreader rumor model
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity

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