Dynamical analysis of a repeated game with incomplete information

From MaRDI portal



Abstract: We study a two player repeated zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in which the underlying state of the game undergoes Markov evolution (parameterized by a transition probability frac12leple1). H"orner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille identified an optimal strategy, sigma∗ for the informed player for p in the range [frac12,frac23]. We extend the range on which sigma∗ is proved to be optimal to about [frac12,0.719] and prove that it fails to be optimal at a value around 0.7328. Our techniques make use of tools from dynamical systems, specifically the notion of pressure, introduced by D. Ruelle.












This page was built for publication: Dynamical analysis of a repeated game with incomplete information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4595957)