Dynamical analysis of a repeated game with incomplete information
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Abstract: We study a two player repeated zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in which the underlying state of the game undergoes Markov evolution (parameterized by a transition probability ). H"orner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille identified an optimal strategy, for the informed player for in the range . We extend the range on which is proved to be optimal to about and prove that it fails to be optimal at a value around 0.7328. Our techniques make use of tools from dynamical systems, specifically the notion of pressure, introduced by D. Ruelle.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207257 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16435 (Why is no real title available?)
- Repeated games with incomplete information
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