Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
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Recommendations
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- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
Cited in
(35)- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
- College assignment as a large contest
- Auctions, market efficiency, and the trade in second-hand and antique silver
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
- Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
- Renewable auctions: bidding for real options
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction
- Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
- Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions
- The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
- The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Efficient Auctions
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- Inefficient rushes in auctions
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
- Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- The private value single item bisection auction
- On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
- Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price
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